As a first step towards trying to find out what the state of the network actually was, we dialed up a number of TIPs around the country. What we generally found was that the TIPs were up, but that their lines were down.
That is, the TIPs were communicating properly with the user over the dial-up line, but no connections to other IMPs were possible.
We tried manually restarting a number of IMPs which are in our own building (after taking dumps, of course). This procedure initializes all of the IMPs' dynamic data structures, and will -2 -RFC 789
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. Eric C. Rosen often clear up problems which arise when, as sometimes happens in most complex software systems, the IMPs' software gets into a "funny" state. The IMPs which were restarted worked well until they were connected to the rest of the net, after which they exhibited the same complex of symptoms as the IMPs which had not been restarted.
From the facts so far presented, we were able to draw a number of conclusions. Any problem which affects all IMPs throughout the network is usually a routing problem. Restarting an IMP re-initializes the routing data structures, so the fact that restarting an IMP did not alleviate the problem in that IMP suggested that the problem was due to one or more "bad" routing updates circulating in the network. IMPs which were restarted would just receive the bad updates from those of their neighbors which were not restarted. If this comparison indicates that u2 is LATER than u1, u1 is simply discarded. If, on the other hand, u1 appears to be the LATER update, IMP A will send u1 to all its neighbors (including the one from which it was received). The sequence number of u1 This very short introduction to the routing algorithm's updating protocol should provide enough background to enable the reader to understand the particular problem under discussion;
further justification and detail can be found in the references.
Let us return now to the discussion of the network outage.
I have already mentioned that the core dumps showed almost all buffers holding routing updates which were waiting to be processed. Close inspection showed that all the updates were from a single IMP, IMP 50. By a strange "coincidence," IMP 50 had been malfunctioning just before the network-wide outage occurred, and was off the net during the period of the outage.
Hence it was not generating any updates during the period of the Our first thought was that maybe the real-time clock in IMP 50 was running one or two orders of magnitude faster than normal, invalidating our assumptions about the maximum number of updates which could be generated in a given time. An alternative hypothesis suggested itself however when we looked at the binary representations of the three sequence numbers:
it's also possible that the "real" update was 8, and was corrupted by added bits. However, bit-dropping has proven itself -10 -RFC 789
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. Eric C. Rosen to be a much more common sort of hardware malfunction than bit-adding, although spontaneously dropped bits may sometimes come back on spontaneously.) Surely, the reader will object, there must be protection against dropped bits. Yes there is protection, but apparently not enough. The update packets themselves are checksummed, so a dropped bit in an update packet is readily detected. Remember though that if an update needs to be retransmitted, it is recreated from tabled information. For maximal reliability, the tables must be checksummed also, and the checksum must be recomputed every time the table is accessed. However, this would require either a large number of CPU cycles (for frequent checksumming of a large area of memory) or a large amount of memory (to store the checksums for a lot of small areas). Since CPU cycles and memory are both potentially scarce resources, this did not seem to us to be a cost-effective way to deal with problems that arise, say, once per year (this is the first such problem encountered in a year and a half of running this routing algorithm (Also, it is not clear that any memory checksumming strategy can be totally free of "cracks.") A very simple and conservative fix to prevent this particular problem from recurring is to modify clause (a) of the definition of LATER so that the "<=" is replaced by "<" (strictly less than). We will implement this fix, but it cannot be guaranteed that no related problems will ever arise.
What is really needed is not some particular fix to the routing algorithm, but a more general fix. In some sense, the problem we saw was not really a routing problem. The routing code was working correctly, and the routes that were generated were correct and consistent. The real problem is that a freakish hardware malfunction caused a high priority process to run wild, devouring resources needed by other processes, thereby making the network unusable. The fact that the wild process was the routing process is incidental. In designing the routing process, we carefully considered the amount of resource utilization it would require. By strictly controlling and limiting the rate at which updates can be generated, we tried to prevent any situation in which the routing process would make excessive demands on the system. As we have seen though, even our carefully designed mechanisms were unable to protect against every possible sort of hardware failure. We need a better means of detecting that some
